Cloned fake RFID tags and malicious RFID readers pose a major threat to the RFID-based supply chain management system. The data (e.g., Electronic Product Code (EPC) number) on a genuine tag can be easily scanned and copied by a malicious RFID reader and the copied data can be embedded onto a fake tag. These cloned fake tags can be attached to\r\ncounterfeit products, which can be introduced into a genuine supply chain, or illegally sold at black and grey markets. Malicious readers may also try to corrupt and snoop on genuine tags. These threats can only be nullified by incorporating a RFID tag-reader mutual authentication scheme. In this paper we propose a simple, secure, and light-weight tagreader mutual authentication scheme that adheres to both EPCglobal Architecture Framework specification and EPCglobal Class 1 Gen 2 UHF RFID Protocol ratified standard. This scheme utilizes the tag\'s access password and also allows the manufacturer of the product to play a vital role in the tag-reader mutual authentication process. As a result we can achieve the following three goals: detect cloned fake tags, ward off maliciously snooping\r\nreaders, and in the process, the manufacturer can also keep track on the whereabouts of its products, which have genuine tags attached to them.
After a trademark dispute, the EPC Prototyping Platform is now called "Fosstrak" (previously Accada). Fosstrak stands for "free and open source software for track and trace".